We study the theory of safety and liveness in a reversible calculus where reductions are totally ordered and rollbacks lead systems to past states. Liveness and safety in this setting naturally correspond to the should-testing and inverse may-testing preorders, respectively. In reversible languages, however, the natural models of these preorders would need to be based on both forward and backward transitions, thus offering complex proof techniques for verification. Here we develop novel fully abstract models of liveness and safety which are based on forward transitions and limited rollback points, giving rise to considerably simpler proof techniques. Moreover, we show that, with respect to safety, total reversibility is a conservative extension to CCS. With respect to liveness, we prove that adding total reversibility to CCS distinguishes more systems. To our knowledge, this work provides the first testing theory for a reversible calculus, and paves the way for a testing theory for causal reversibility.
Introduction
A reversible system is a system that can execute forwards but also backwards, reversing the effects of its computations. Systems that can go back to past states appear in different disciplines, including fault-tolerant systems [8] , reverse debugging [10] , transactional systems [24] , and computational biology [3] . Moreover, Landauer's principle [2] , [13] , stating that only information loss in irreversible computation needs to consume energy, has sparked recent interest in low energy reversible computing.
Despite the wide interest in reversibility [4] , [15] , [19] , its underlying behavioural theory is still being developed. Lanese et al. [15] have observed that, surprisingly, strong barbed congruence [17] , the behavioural equivalence most closely related to bisimulation, is too coarse of a relation for a reversible calculus (even more in the weak case). On the other hand, if the equivalence distinguishes the direction of reductions (backward or forward), as in the case of back and forth bisimulation [19] , then it is too fine as it coincides with history-preserving bisimulation. Therefore bisimulation-based relations seem to be unsatisfactory notions of behavioural equivalence in reversibility.
In the presence of non-determinism, many alternatives to bisimulation-based behavioural equivalences exist [23] . The most common ones are the may-and must-testing [6] and the should-testing [20] preorders. The may-testing preorder is known to correspond to the preservation of safety properties. To briefly explain this, consider a safety property P which expresses that "something bad will not happen" [12] . Safety properties are exactly the properties enforced by monitors [21] , which can be thought of as test processes running in parallel with the system, reporting property violations on a special channel ω. Thus, if M ∼ safe N (i.e., M fails all the tests that N fails) and T is a monitor of P, if the parallel composition N T can output on ω (i.e., one execution of N violates the property monitored by T ) then M T can also output on ω. This implies N ∼ may M , according to the may-testing preorder.
Similarly, preservation of liveness properties can be expressed using either the must-or the should-testing preorder. In this case tests report on ω "when something good eventually happens". However there is a subtle difference between the two testing preorders. In must testing, if M T can diverge without an output on ω, the test fails. The intuition is that M has an execution where the "something good" will not eventually happen. This is a problem in reversibility because a reversible term can infinitely go back and forth between adjacent states, thus it fails every must-test.
On the other hand, M passing a should-test T requires that all future states of M T have the potential to output on ω (perhaps after performing some reductions) [20] . In a sense this requires that ω is always enabled. If this is the case in an infinite execution, and we assume that infinitely enabled outputs are bound to happen (a fairness assumption), then the success criterion of should testing is justified. Expressing the preservation of liveness properties using shouldtesting is suitable even for reversible languages. Therefore, in this paper we develop the theory of safety and liveness preservation in terms of the inverse may-testing and shouldtesting preorders, respectively.
If we were to apply the standard models of these preorders [6] , [20] to a reversible language we would end up with proof techniques that treat forward and backward moves uniformly. This means that in proofs using these potential models, we would need to consider traces and failure trees that are composed of both kinds of moves. We believe that such proofs would be cumbersome and impractical in sizeable examples. In this paper we instead develop models that are mostly based on forward moves, significantly simplifying the resulting proof techniques. Our model of safety preservation is (inverse) forward trace inclusion, identical to classic CCS. This means that reversibility is a conservative extension of CCS with respect to safety. The result here relies on the property that any state reachable from an initial system can be reached with only forward moves. This property holds in other reversible calculi (e.g., [4] , [5] , [14] ) where our safety model applies, although it is not true in communicating transactions [7] .
For liveness preservation, however, it is unclear that models of forward traces are sound. For example the CCS system M = νa.(a.c.0 a.0 a.0) fails the liveness test T = c.ω since the parallel composition of M and T may reduce (written − ) to a state in which any synchronisation on c is not possible; that is
which is deadlocked and cannot reach ω. On the other hand, if we consider a rollback capability, the system N = νa.(a.c.0 a(γ).rl γ a.0) where γ is the identifier of the a-input and rl γ rolls back this input, passes T because the a-reduction that led to deadlock in M can be reversed in N . The transitions of the two systems are shown in Fig. 1 , where arrows are decorated with the synchronisation name, and M ω and N ω represent successful states. It is apparent that M 1 is a state from which success cannot be reached, whereas all states of N T can reach success. Thus M fails T and N passes T , according to should-testing, showing that reverse transitions play a role in liveness.
This example establishes that some rollback behaviour must be taken into account in a model of the liveness preorder. The question now becomes: does a sound characterisation of the liveness preorder need to consider the full generality of the backward transitions and explore all states reachable with forward and backward moves? For a language with total reversibility, we answer this question to the negative, providing a simple model for the liveness preorder. This model is based on a novel definition of tree refusals, and only requires us to consider the forward transitions of systems together with a very limited set of rollback actions. This makes liveness easy to understand and provides a simple proof technique of liveness preservation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we respectively present CCS roll and the contextual preorders for safety and liveness. In Sec. 4 we describe the two crucial semantic properties for the soundness of our forward-transition models of the preorders. In Sec. 5 we give a compositional semantics in terms of a labelled transition system (LTS) for forward moves and key results on LTS traces necessary for the models of the preorders (Sections 6 and 7). Sec. 8 contains related work and conclusions. Technical details of results presented here can be found in an online report [16] .
The Language CCS roll
The language CCS roll extends CCS with a form of controlled reversibility, where reductions are totally ordered and systems can be programmed to return to any previous state. As in CCS, synchronisation between processes occurs over channel names (Name) according to a total, irreflexive bijection ( · ) over Name. Unlike CCS, unique keys (Key) are used to identify and roll back synchronisation and internal (τ ) reductions.
The CCS roll syntax is shown in Fig. 2 and is organised in two levels: processes and systems. Processes (Proc) include standard CCS processes for infinite choice operator i∈I α i (γ).P i , where I is an indexing set; parallel composition P Q; name restriction νa.P ; recursive process definition recX(γ).P , process variable X and a rollback primitive rl ι , where variable ι ranges over keys k and key variables γ. A key variable γ decorates both prefix and recursion. When a prefix is reduced (or a recursion in unfolded), γ is replaced with a fresh key k in the continuation. From this point, the process can roll back to the state before this reduction by executing rl k . By convention when I = ∅ we have i∈I α i (γ).P i = 0.
Systems (Sys) are build up from named processes k:P and memories [µ; k]. In k:P the key k identifies the reduction that produced P , which may be shared with other processes produced by the same reduction. A memory [µ; k] records that the named process µ was involved in the k-reduction. If a past k-reduction was a synchronisation, the current system will contain two memories [µ 1 ; k] and [µ 2 ; k] recording the named processes that synchronised. Otherwise the k-reduction was internal (i.e. either a τ prefix or a recursive process unfold) and the system will contain only one memory of the form [µ; k]. 0 represents the inactive configuration. We make use of two structural equivalence over systems and processes, ranged over by A, B, C ∈ Sys ∪ Proc. Definition 1 (Structural Equivalences). Limited structural equivalence ( ) for systems is defined to be the least equivalence satisfying the axioms (1) of Fig. 2 and closed under parallel (− −) and name restriction (νa.−). Structural equivalence (≡) is obtained by also requiring the axioms (2) is a dependency history, recording the order of reductions and derived by the following grammar:
The reduction semantics of CCS roll is defined by transitions between configurations of the form
The side-condition guarantees that each k in a dependency history is recorded at most once. We write D ≺ D for the concatenation of D and D , and
When the dependency history D is clear from the context we will
Before a configuration starts running, it contains no memories and no keys corresponding to past reductions. We call these configurations initial. To abide to the syntax for systems we consider one special key ε which is used to annotate processes in initial systems of the form M ε:P . A configuration D M is initial if M ε:P and D = ε. In the following we use standard CCS abbreviations, such as o for a sequence o 1 , . . . , o n , where n is implicit. We write k(o) for the set of keys in o except for ε, and
is the set of free names in o. We omit variables γ when not used.
The reduction relation of CCS roll → (over configurations) is defined as the union of the forward reduction relation − and the backward, or rollback, relation − →. Relations − and − → are given in − − M are adapted from CCS. Note that rule (RSYNC) generates two memories, each one containing the named process contributing to the synchronisation and the fresh key k. Rule (Rτ ) generates one memory containing the named process performing the internal action along with the key of the reduction. When a prefix is reduced (via rule Rα or RREC) the bound variable γ is substituted with the new key in the continuation of the process, replacing free occurrences of γ in terms rl γ , allowing the roll-back of the reduction.
A backward reduction D M − → D M is derived by applying rule BW and then RLSYS of Fig. 4 only when a rollback of k is enabled in M (i.e. M ≡ l:rl k N ). In CCS roll actions are totally ordered, and their identifying keys are stored in the dependency history D. Reverting a k-action reverts all actions that came after it (RLSYS). Each reduction of the form M k − − → N is derived from the rules in the first part of Fig. 4 , which broadcast the k-rollback throughout M . Processes and memories in M that do not contain k are left unaffected by this transition; k-processes disappear and k-memories reinstate their contents.
Note that the l : rl k that initiated the rollback in M will be consumed by the reduction, provided that (D M ) is well-formed: by definition of well-formedness, the final (D M ) will be well-formed and will not contain the key k, thus it will not contain the process l : rl k . We
As an example we consider the reductions of the initial configuration (ε N T ) depicted in Fig. 1 , where N = νa.ε:(a.c a(γ).rl γ a) and T = ε:c.ω. This is a non-deterministic configuration, where RSYNC can lead to a synchronisation between the first and third, or second and third, processes in N . In the latter we get:
Since the process rl k is enabled in N 1 and N 1 T k − − → νa.(ε:a.c ε:a(γ).rl γ ε:a) T , rule BW can be applied:
(ε:a.c ε:a(γ).rl γ ε: a) T and the resulting process is structurally equivalent to ε N T , which is the initial configuration. By synchronising the first and the third process of N the ω can be reached by further synchronising on c, as follows:
In CCS roll , rollbacks are deterministic. Moreover, any forward k-reduction can be rolled back, and when this happens the configuration returns to the state before the kreduction, up to structural equivalence. To establish more properties for configurations we require them to be well-formed. This definition guarantees that in a configuration D M , keys in M were produced by a past reduction recorded in D, and any such reduction can be rolled back and repeated obtaining the same system. These properties are sufficient to describe well-behaved systems, simplifying the definitions of previous work [14] .
Well-formedness is preserved by structural equivalence and reductions. This, together with the fact that initial configurations are trivially well-formed, allows us to implicitly assume configuration to be well-formed in the following sections.
Safety and Liveness Preorders
In this section we give the definitions of the safety and liveness preorders, and examples of their use. As we discussed in the introduction, the safety preorder corresponds to the inverse may-testing preorder [6] and the liveness preorder corresponds to the should-testing preorder [20] . Here we use tests T derived from the grammar of processes, with the addition of a special name ω used by the test to report an outcome. Definition 3 (Basic Observable (barb)). D M has a strong barb,
We are interested in testing initial configurations; the composition of a configuration ε M with a test T is ε M ε:T . We start with safety. A safety test T can be thought of as a monitor enforcing a safety policy. When T reports an error on ω then the enforced safety policy has been violated by the system. Thus, a system M passes a safety test T when their parallel composition cannot report a violation on ω. This, in negative form, means that M fails T if ε M ε:T ⇓ ω . System M is potentially "less safe" than N when M has at least the violations of N . Definition 4 (Safety Preorder). For two initial systems M and N we write M ∼ safe N when for all tests T , ε N ε:T ⇓ ω implies ε M ε:T ⇓ ω .
On the other hand, we can consider liveness tests that report on ω when "something good" happens. A system M passes a liveness test T when their parallel composition has no way of failing the test. According to should-testing [20] , a system passes a test if at any reachable state, success is reachable; M is potentially "less live" than N if N passes every liveness test that M passes.
Definition 5 (Passing a Liveness Test & Liveness Preorder
).
An initial system M passes the liveness test T , written M shd T , when ε M ε:T → * D N implies D N ⇓ ω , ∀D, N . For two initial systems M and N we write M ∼ live N when for all liveness tests T , M shd T implies N shd T .
In the example systems in Fig. 5 , M 1 and N 1 are CCS processes. In CCS these are safe-equivalent because they have the same traces. With respect to the liveness preorder, also in CCS,
.ω but N 1 does not: after a communication on a, N 1 T can become c.0 b.ω, which cannot reach ω. The same is true in CCS roll . The following conservative extension theorem holds for safety in CCS rollits proof relies in the models for safety in the two languages. 
Important Reduction Properties
Our safety and liveness models rely on two semantic properties. The first is that, starting from any system, any state reachable with arbitrary reductions can also be reached with only forward reductions after at most one backward move. Thus, all states of an initial system, which has no backward moves, can be reached with only forward reductions.
The consequence of this is that forward traces are sufficient to characterise safety. This property also holds in any calculus whose reversibility machinery is causally consistent, thus our forward-only model of safety applies to other reversible systems. This property is also necessary for the characterisation of liveness. However we also need to establish a result for tree failures [20] : if an initial configuration can reach a state D N from which it fails to reach an ω-action, then the same original configuration should be able to reach a failure state D 1 N 1 where all reachable states can be reached with forward reductions. This allows us to use a forward LTS to encode liveness. Property 2. Let ε M − * D N ⇓ ω and k(M ) = ∅; there exist D 1 and N 1 such that:
In CCS roll , where reductions are temporally dependent, we can show that once we reach the state D N we can explore all past states reachable with rollbacks from D N and pick the oldest one. Because of the total temporal ordering of reductions we know that there is always a single oldest state (up to structural equivalence ≡) D 1 N 1 . Since no older state is reachable, all states reachable from D 1 N 1 can be reached with only forward reductions.
Compositional Semantics
Our characterisation of safety and liveness in CCS roll is based on a compositional Labelled Transition System (LTS) of forward transitions between compositional configurations of the form D |= M , greatly simplifying reasoning. We let C range over compositional configurations. The LTS transition relation α(k) − −− → is defined as the smallest relation derived from Fig. 6 , closed under , parallel and restriction, provided that k in the label is fresh.
These transitions, besides internal reductions, can describe the interaction of a part of a system with its environment, which we call the observer. We assume the adaptation of the definition of well-formed configurations to compositional configuration and work with well-formed compositional configurations. As expected, forward reductions correspond to τ -transitions in the LTS.
Our theory is based on canonical traces; t is canonical if each key in t appears at most once in t. A trace is a dependency history transformer and can be typed as such. Definition 6 (Trace Typing). We write (D t D ) for the predicate defined by the following rules:
We will treat (D t D ) as a typed trace; this formalism helps us to synchronise dependency histories with traces. History Zipping: Canonical traces are typable, provided they use new keys, and any typed trace is canonical.
Traces encode both the observable and internal (τ ) actions of a system. Systems related by the safety and liveness preorders may have traces that differ in their internal actions. We write obs(t) to denote the sub-trace of t containing only observable actions: obs( ) = and obs(τ (k), t) = obs(t) and obs(a(k), t) = a(k), obs(t).
We say that a trace t is observable when obs(t) = t. We write t to denote the same-length trace derived from t by applying ( · ) to all non-τ actions. If t 1 = t 2 then we call t 1 and t 2 complementary. A single LTS transition of two parallel systems can be decomposed to either a transition of one of the systems, or a synchronisation between them. This leads to a general decomposition of the trace of two parallel systems. To this end we define a notion of history zipping D 1 D 2 D and transition zipping (
to indicate the parallel composition of two histories and transitions, respectively, of independent systems, taking into account event synchronisations among the two systems. Both zipping relations are derived by the rules of 
Conversely, if two systems can perform typed traces that can be zipped into a single zipped trace, then the parallel composition of these systems can perform this trace.
Model of the Safety Preorder
We now show that the safety preorder coincides with inverse observable trace inclusion. Definition 7 (Trace Set). We write Tr(C) for the largest set of observable traces such that t ∈ Tr(C) when there exists t and C such that obs(t ) = t and C t − → C .
Observable traces correspond to the class of safety tests defined by the rules:
Lemma 4. Let t be an observable trace; then
− → D T ↓ ω then there exists a permutation p such that t = pt .
Our characterisation of the safety preorder is the inverse of the following trace preorder. It is now easy to check that systems Fig. 5 are safe-equivalent because they have the same observable traces.
Model of the Liveness Preorder
Our model of the liveness preorder is based on forward traces and the following basic observable for rollback actions, determined entirely by the structure of terms. Definition 9 (Rollback Barb). If ∆ is a set of keys, we write
Based on this minimal basic observable for rollbacks, we define the set of observable traces of a configuration C which lead to a rollback of an action before C. The main structure of our liveness model is a tree refusal adapted for reversibility. Definition 11 (Tree Refusal). A tree refusal is a tuple (t; V ; W ), where t is an observable trace, and V and W are sets of observable traces, and: (1) ∈ V and V is prefix-closed; (2) ∈ W and W ⊆ V ; (3) V and W are closed under permutation of keys.
A tree refusal (t; V ; W ) encodes a particular way by which an initial system M can fail a liveness test T : M communicates with T according to the actions in t, and together they reach a state D N from which an ω is not reachable, thus failing the test. We consider tests T that allows a unique such state. After the trace t, the test offers to communicate on any of the traces in W , after which it outputs on ω. This means that W contains a set of traces that M cannot complete (since M fails T ). Moreover, since any system can perform the empty trace, we require that ∈ W . Since D N is the only failing state, if the system rolls back before this state, the test succeeds. The set of traces V are traces that may or may not lead to success (W ⊆ V ) but can be used by the system to roll back before the state D N .
Since M fails T , the traces V cannot lead the process to roll-back before the failing state. Tree refusals correspond to the following class of characteristic liveness tests. Definition 12 (Characteristic Liveness Tests). We can now define our model of liveness for CCS roll , which is the following refusal preorder. Definition 14 (Refusal Preorder). For initial systems,
This preorder is sound and complete with respect to the liveness preorder, and therefore can be used as a method for proving the liveness preorder in examples. 
Related Work and Conclusions
Despite the wide interest in reversibility [4] , [15] , [19] , its underlying behavioural theory is still not settled. In this paper we have studied the theory of safety and liveness for CCS roll , which extends CCS with controlled, total reversibility. We based our theory on the inverse may-and the shouldtesting preorders, which we argued are the natural preorders capturing safety and liveness in a reversible language. Our liveness preorder can distinguish the pair (M 2 , N 2 ) which is equated by Phillip's refusal testing [18] . We leave as future work establishing a better relation with Phillip's refusal testing.
We have developed fully abstract models of these preorders, based solely on forward transitions, and, in the case of liveness, a limited set of rollback actions. These models are a significant improvement over the standard models because they provide us with simple proof techniques that do not need to consider the full generality of the backward transitions.
In CCS roll reductions are temporally ordered, forming a total order, and rollback always returns a system to a past state. Imposing a total order among concurrent actions is used in approaches to rollback recovery [9] , distributed debugging [11] , and rollback-replay [22] . In other reversible calculi, reductions are causally ordered, and rollback is more involved [1] , [4] , [14] , [15] , [19] . We have opted for this form of reversibility for simplicity, in order to develop a first theory of testing for reversible languages. The adaptation of our theory to uncontrolled reversibility [4] , [15] , [19] is immediate because in such a setting all system states are reachable from each-other. Thus may-testing implies shouldtesting and our may-testing model is fully abstract with respect to both safety and liveness preorders (safety and liveness collapse to the same relation).
We have identified two sufficient properties for our safety and liveness theories to apply to any reversible language. In fact, the first property holds in languages with controlled, causal reversibility [1] , [14] and therefore our safety theory immediately applies to them. The problem of determining whether the second property applies to [1] , [14] remains open. We view the identification of this property as a first important step towards the development of a liveness theory for controlled, causal reversibility.
We have showed that with respect to safety, total reversibility is a conservative extension of CCS. With respect to liveness, however, adding total reversibility to CCS distinguishes more systems. The characterisations we have developed for reversibility are fundamentally different than those for communicating transactions [7] , illuminating the difference between the two constructs. To our knowledge, this work provides the first models of testing, safety and liveness for a reversible language.
